A CRITICISM OF THE RAILROAD CORPORATION LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA
(Continued from the September Number.)
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RAILROAD

We have now come to the final phase of our examination of railroad legislation in Pennsylvania, i. e., the
development of the railroad. The Acts may be divided
into two classes, those which treat of the financial, and those
which treat of the physical, growth of the company.
Of the first class, are the statutes concerning the increase
and decrease of capital stock and debts, the extension
of the company's corporate existence, its acquisition or
guaranty of the stock and bonds of other corporations,
its consolidation or merger with other corporations or
its purchase or lease of their property or the sale or lease
to them of its own property. Of the second class, are
the statutes concerning the widening, extending or improving of the road, the construction of branches and
extensions and the connection of one road with other
roads.
The statutes which give railroad companies the right
to increase their stock and bonds have been considered
in most of their aspects when we discussed the right
to issue stock and bonds. The amount to which stock
and bonds might be issued and on what terms, and the
penalty for issuing them illegally, already have been
referred to, and perhaps the only matter which we need
to touch on here is the procedure provided. The Act of
x868 was the first to prescribe on what terms an increase
of stock would be authorized, no procedure being indicated in the earliest Act permitting an increase." Under
the Act of i868, the increase must be recommended by
the directors of the company, approved by a majority of
" Act of
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its stockholders, and a certificate of the amount of the
increase filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
The Constitution of r&74,
t. XVI, Sec. 7, forbade the
increase of stock "without the consent of the persons
holding the larger amount in value of the stock," and a
general Act to carry its provisions into effect was passed
i8 April, 1874, P. L. 6i. The Act of I74 does not refer
specifically to railroads, but in so far as the Act of 1868
permits the increase of stock by the vote of a majority
of the stockholders, it must be considered repealed by
the Act of 1874,' which, accordant to the Constitution,

requires the vote of the holders of a majority of the
stock, although there are intimations to the effect that
the Act of x868 still is in force." The Act of 9 February,
igoi, P. L., 3, provides an even more elaborate procedure
than the Act of 1874, but does not change any material
part of the earlier method.
The legislation on the subject of decreasing capital
stock is not very important in Pennsylvania, where
there is no annual tax imposed dependent in amount on
the nominal capitalization. It is sufficient to say that the
Act of 8 June, 1893, P. L. 351, furnishes a careful system
for the reduction of the capital stock of all classes of
corporations, including railroads, to an amount "not
below the amount of capital stock required by law for the
formation of such company."
Of course there is no question of more vital importance
to a railroad company than that of its right to alter or
amend its charter if experience proves that more favorable
provisions could be adopted, but there is no legislation at
all permitting any change in the articles of association
or charter of a railroad company, although there is an
elaborate act permitting the improvement, amendment or
alteration of the articles of association and charter of
corporations organized under the General Corporation
Act of 29 April, 1874.-' So, too, while Section 40 of the
5 Chartiers Connecting R. R. Co., x Pa. C. C. 270, z886.
Com. v. Buffalo & SusquehannaR. R. Co., 207 Pa. 154, 1903.
47 13 June, 1883, P. L. 122, amended by the Act of 31 March, x9o5,
P. L. 93.
'

A CRITICISM OF THE RAILROAD

Act of 1874 prescribes a careful and orderly way for a
corporation organized under its provisions, whose term
of existence is about to expire, to. renew its charter, the
only legislation conferring on railroads this valuable
privilege is the Act of i6 June, 189i, P. L. 301, which
permits a railroad completed and in operation for not less
than io years, at any time before the expiration of its
corporate existence, to file with the Secietary of the Commonwealth a certificate under its common seal, attested
by the signature of its presiding officer, stating for how
long it desires to have its corporate existence extended,
and thereupon its existence shall be so extended." Such
an extension is practically the creation of a new corporation, and the writer has very serious doubts whether
it should be permitted except by the unanimous consent
of the stockholders. Certainly it should be required that
a majority of them favor it, as prescribed by the Act of
1874, and to permit or to attempt to permit this important step to be taken by the filing of a paper simply
signed by the president, but which need never have been
presented to the stockholders, is to our mind of doubtful
legality. Not only is the Act of 189i improper from the
standpoint of the stockholders of the corporation, but it
is utterly inconsistent with the principle so stoutly upheld,
whether wisely or not, in this State, that a corporation
can not be created without the consent of the Governor.
The Act of 1874 provides for this approval, after requiring the presentation of a statement showing the financial
condition of the company, and thus affording to the Gvernor some evidence of what the corporation has done,
and enabling him to deduce therefrom an opinion as to
whether the renewal of its existence is likely to be of benefit to the State. Some such requirement should appear
in the Act of 189I.
Our corporation now has perfected its internal condition, and seeks to enlarge its scope. It desires to buy the
stock of other companies, or perhaps to lease or buy them
48See opinion of Carson, Atty.
6x6, 1904.

Gen., in re Victor Coal Co., 13 Dist.
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or to merge and consolidate them. In each case, its rights
and powers are only such as legislation confers. In the
absence of that, it may not buy 4 ' or guaranty 0the
stock or bonds of another corporation or lease 5' or buy5:
its road and franchises or merge its road or franchises
into or consolidate them with those of any other corporation.' Let us then take up the statutes on each of
these subjects, leaving, however, temporarily, the question of the protection which they afford to minority stockholders, and the question of their constitutionality.
The first Act permitting a railroad company to buy and
hold the stock and bonds of other railroad companies, is
the Act of 23 April, 1861, P.L. 410, which permits the
purchase and holding of the stock and bonds only of
railroads chartered by, or authorized to extend into,
Pennsylvania. The Act of 31 March, 1868, P.L.5o,
did not mention railroads, but as it permitted any corporation to invest in the stocks and bonds of any other
corporation, railroads were clearly included. The Act
of 17 March, 1869, P.L.ii, amplified the Act of i86i
by permitting the guaranty of bonds, as well as their
purchase and holding, and by including within its terms
railroads neither chartered in Pennsylvania nor authorized to extend their road therein. The Act of i5 April,
1869, P.L. 31, is very broad: it authorizes railroad com-

panies to buy and guaranty the stock and bonds of
"corporations authorized by law to develop the coal,
iron, lumber and other material interests of this Commonwealth." Quite outside of any constitutional question, the impolicy of an Act like this seems to us evident.
It attempts to permit the diversion of capital contributed
for the purpose of constructing or maintaining and
"McMillan v. CarsonHill Mining Co., 12 Phila. 4o9, 1878; Marbury
v. Ky. Land Co., 62 Fed. 335, 1894; Louisville etc. R. R. Co., v. Ky.,
x61 Z. S. 677, x896, at 698.
50Pennypacker v. Camden & Atlantic R. R. Co-, 3 Penny. 402, x883.
' Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Bedford etc. R. R. Co., 811 Pa. 104,
1871; Van Steuben v. C. R. R. of N. Jersey, 178 Pa. 367, 1896.
6' Thirteenth etc. Ry. Co. v. Broad St. etc. Ry. Co., 13 Dist. 8o8, 1904.
is Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, r864.
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operating railroads, to the promotion- of that vastly
indefinite class of enterprises included within the term
"corporations.. to develop., the material interests of
this Commonwealth," and renders the investor in a
railroad company a remediless, however relctant,-speculator in a mining venture at the option of a majority
of those with whom he thought that he was associating.
to engage in railroading.

The Act of i4 April, 1870, P.L.

75, seems as to this subject quite unnecessary in view of
the broad language of the Act of 1869, for the latter
Act probably gave the power specifically conferred by
the former, to buy and hold the stock and bonds of
canal and navigation companies. With the Constitution
of 1874 came a reaction against the liberal permission
granted to one corporation to buy the stock and bonds
of another, expressed in the General Corporation Act of
29 April 1874, P. L. 73, section 12 of which forbade companies organized under its provisions-which of course did
not include railroads-from buying or holding the stock
of any other corporation except as collateral security for
a debt. The railroad Acts, however, were not amended.
Until the Act of 4 April, i9oI P.L. 62 (amended 23 April,
1903, P.L.28o), there was no additional legislation on
the subject of the purchase or holding by a railroad company of the stocks or bonds of other companies. That
Act permitted the purchase and guaranty of the stock
and bonds of any corporation "engaged in the business of
transportation, either on land or water, and also of any
warehouse, storage, elevator or terminal company, whose
business is incidental to the business of transportation
in which the purchasing or guarantying corporation
shall be authorized to engage." This indicated the
tendency toward a broader view, and the Act of 2 July,
19oi, P.L.6o 3 , brought the legislation back to the conditions obtaining when the Act of 31 March, 1868, was in

force, by giving all corporations organized for profit the
right to buy and guaranty the stock and bonds of any
domestic or foreign corporation. This certainly should
have been broad enough to include the purchase and
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guaranty of the stock and bonds of water companies,
by railroad companies, but for some unknown reason
such purchases were authorized specifically by the Act
of 22 April, 1905, P L.264. This concludes the review
of statutes enabling railroad companies to buy or guaranty
the stock or bonds of other corporations, except that the
Consolidation Act of 29 May, igoi, P.L. 3 4 9 , confers power
to buy and own stock, but inasmuch as the title as well
as the body of the Act deals only with the question of
merger, the power conferred must be considered as conferred merely for the purpose of merger. Here are nine
statutes all in force, dealing with practically the same
subject. Could a stronger argumeift for codification be
found?
The lease by one railroad of another was permitted
first by the Act of 13 March, 1847, P. L. 3 3 7 , as explained
by the Act of 29 March, 1859, P.L.29 o. No procedure
is fixed and the only limitation imposed is that the companies concerned must own "connecting railroads in the
State of Pennsylvania." The Act of 23 April, 1861,
P.L.41o, repeated in almost identical terms the words of
the Act of 1859, on the subject of leases, except that it
provided that the roads concerned might connect either
directly or by means of intervening railroads. That the
Act of 1861 was not intended to repeal the Act of 1859 is
evident from the fact that a supplement to the latter Act
was passed i May, 1861, P.L.48 5 . Now comes the Act of
17 February, 187o, P.L. 3 i ,which permitted the assignment
of railroad leases, and added to the requirement that
the roads of the company concerned should connect, the
words "thus forming a continuous route or routes for the
transportation of persons and property." Just what the
Act of I87o accomplishes, is not clear. It has been suggested that it was to overcome the decision that railroads to be connecting under the Act of 23 April, 1861,
need not be so related to each other as to permit of the
continuous movement of trains over their tracks,"
5,P. & E. R. R. Co. v. Catawissa R. R. Co., 53 Pa. 2o, x866.
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but if this were the object of the Act it is d6tibtful whether
the mere addition of the words "thus forming a continuous route" is verbally sufficient to effect it,' and if it
is, inasmuch as the Act of 1870 did not repeal the Act
of i861,'

railroads still could enter into leases under

the latter Act, anyway. Again, it has been suggested,
and by so eminent an authority as Judge Sharswood,
that "the Act of 17 February, 1870 was evidently intended
merely to extend the privilege granted by the Act of i86i,
so as to include the lease of a road beyond the limits of
the Commonwealth." '
This probably was the intention of the Act, but there is nothing in it which permits
the lease of a road beyond the limits of the Commonwealth
unless these words do: "Whether the road or roads embraced in such lease, assignment, or contract may be
within the limits of this State, or created by or existing
under the laws of any other State or States." The Act
of i861 had contained this alternative: "Any railroad
company or companies, chartered by or of which the
road or roads is or are authorized to extend into this Commonwealth." Since the road of a company created under
the laws of another State might be authorized to extend
into Pennsylvania, it is open to question it the latter
branch of the alternative in the Act of 187o refers to
roads outside of Pennsylvania, and does not refer merely
to foreign corporations authorized to construct or operate
roads in Pennsylvania.

The Act of 14 April, 1870, P.L.7 5 ,

permits a railroad company to lease the canal, navigation
and property of a canal or navigation company under the
same conditions as it could lease the road of another
railroad company, and the Act of 5 July, 1883, P.L.176,
requires that the leased rolling stock of a railroad shall
be marked with the name of the lessor, followed by the
word "lessor."
There are but two acts enabling a -railroad to buy anHampe v. Pittsburgetc. Traction Co., 165 Pa. 468, x89S.
Hampe v. Pittsburgetc. Traction Co., supra.
'Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Bedford etc. R. R. Co., 81 1 Pa.

8

at 113.

104, 1871,
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other railroad; one, the Act of 21 June, 1865, P.L. 852,
permitting the purchase of a road sold and conveyed by
virtue of any mortgage or deed of trust, or of any process
of decree of a state or federal court, by a company "of
which the road connects therewith," and the other, the
Act of 22 March, i9o, P.L. 5 3 , permitting "any railroad
corporation of this Commonwealth, having a railroad
connecting with that of any other like corporation, and
owning at least two-thirds of the capital stock of the
latter, to acquire.. and thereafter be possessed of, own,
hold, exercise and enjoy, all the franchises, corporate
property, rights and credits then possessed, owned, held or
exercised, by said last-mentioned vendor corporation."
There is prescribed an elaborate mode of procedure,
which does not seem open to other criticism than that a
copy of the agreement of sale and of the certificate of its
adoption ought to be recorded not only in the office of
the Secretary of the Commonwealth, but also in the counties in which the roads concerned are operated.
The legislation on consolidation and merger is fuller.
The first enabling act is that of May 16, 186i,P.L. 702,
which has served as a model for similar statutes down
to this time. It permitted any "railroad company
chartered by this Commonwealth to merge its corporate
rights, powers and privileges, into any other railroad
company so chartered, connecting therewith, so that by
virtue of this Act such companies may be consolidated."
For the adoption of the agreement of consolidation and
merger, there is needed only a majority of the votes cast
at the stockholders' meetings of each corporation. One
serious objection to the Act is that a small number of
stockholders representing an unimportant stockholding
interest may cause a consolidation to be effected. The
Constitution of 1874 provides (Art. XVI, Sec. 7) that a
corporation may not increase its stock or indebtedness
-Unless, indeed, the so-called merger provided for by the Act of 16
May, i865, P.L.7o2, hereinafter discussed, really amounts to a sale
by the road said to merge, to the road into which the merger is said
to be made.
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except with the consent of "the persons holding the larger
amount in value of the stock." Consolidation is a much
more serious matter, and a majority of the small number of stockholders which constitutes a quorum, stockholders who may hold an infinitesimal amount in value of
the stock, should not be given the power to force consolidation. We do not desire to exaggerate the defects of the
Act of i86i, and fairness compels us to suggest that this
bad feature of the Act is counteracted to some extent by
the requirement that the directors of the company also
shall approve the agreement of merger. Supplements
of 27 April, 1864, P.L.6I 7 , and of 23 March, i865, P.L.4I,
respectively, permit the company into which merger is
made to increase its stock to an amount expedient to
effect the merger, but not in excess of the stock-issued
or authorized?--of the merged company, and to issue
mortgage bonds for the debts of the merged company,
but not in excess of the amount of such debts.
The very day after the second supplement to the Act
of i86i was approved, an entirely new consolidation act,
the Act of 24 March, 1865, P.L. 49, also was approved.
This new act was passed at the instance of the Atlantic
and Great Western Railway Company, and was "the subject of an unpleasant investigation which has cast a
shade of suspicion over it." " The Act of 186I permitted
the consolidation only of two Pennsylvania corporations:
the Act of i865 permitted a Pennsylvania corporation to
consolidate with any other railroad company "of this
or any other State, whenever the two, or more, railroads
of the companies, or corporations, so to be consolidated,
shall, or may, form a continuous line of railroad, with
each other, or by means of any intervening railroad."
The procedure prescribed is about the same as that in
the Act of 1861, but there are two improvements made:
in the first place, notice of the meeting to act on the
agreement of consolidation must be mailed to each
stockholder, instead of merely being published in
-9 Per Mr. J. Read, -P. & E. R. R. Co., v. Catawissa R. R. Co., 53

Pa.

20,

1866 at 36.
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newspapers, and in the second place, the agreement to
be adopted must be approved by "two-thirds of all the
votes of all the stockholders," which is much better than
the requirement of the Act of 1861, of a majority of those
voting at the meeting, although not yet fair to stockholders
who, although less than one-third in number, may own
much more than the larger amount in value of the stock,
although the Act possibly might be construed to require
two-thirds in amount of the stock. There is one glaring
omission of words in the most important sentence of
the Act, which has never been corrected, although as
pointed out forty years ago, it "makes nonsense of
the Act;" ' viz., the Act permits any railroad company
of this Commonwealth "to merge and consolidate its
capital stock, franchises and property of any railroad
company, or companies, or corporations organized and
operated under the laws of this, or any other State,"
etc. Does the Act of 1865 repeal the Act of 1861? At
first sight one would say that, being later legislation on
the same subject, it does, but that it was not intended
to is evident from the fact that subsequent to the passage of the Act of 1865, the Legislature passed a most
ridiculous Act, hereafter discussed, which it called a
supplement to the Act of 186.
By implication the
present Attorney-General has decided the matter in the
same way, in a recent case.' On principle, the same
conclusion must be reached, because, despite first appearance the two Acts do not relate to the same subjectmatter. The Act of 1861 is predicated of two railroad
companies, A and B, one of which is to merge into the
other, as A into B. The Act of 1865 concerns a case
where both go out of existence by forming a new corporation, C. This would explain the otherwise mysterious failure to incorporate into the Act of 1865
the excellent provisions of the Acts of 27 April, 1864,
P.L.61 7 , and 23 March, 1865, P.L.41, for if the result of
60 Ibid.
M io April 1869, P. L. 24.
61In re Bellevue etc. Ry. Co. Ops. of Atty-Gen. 1903-4, p.

52,

1903.
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the Act of 1865 is to create a new corporation, provisions for an increase of stock or debts would be unnecessary. The fact that the agreement between the
directors of the two companies is to specify "the
name of the new corporation .

.

,

the manner of

converting the capital stock of each of said companies
into that of the new corporation" and other provisions
appropriate to the formation of a new company,
also lead to the conclusion that the Act of 1865 was designed to effect a termination of the existence of both
constituent companies, instead of only one as the Act of
1861 was. What the advantages of the one operation
are over the other, is not apparent, and why the provisions for each are different seems without much reason.
The Act of io April, 1869, P.L.24, before referred to,
purports to authorize companies merging under the Act
of 1861 to provide "what corporate rights, powers, obligations, duties and franchises created by the charter, or
existing under or in pursuance of or by force of any Act
of Assembly relating to either of said companies, shall
be transferred to or become vested in, or shall continue
in the company into which said merger is made; and
the said consolidated company shall be subject to and
be regulated and governed only by the corporate rights,
powers, duties, obligations and franchises so specified in
and vested by said agreement." Taken literally, the
Act would seem to authorize a railroad company to free
itself from all the obligations and yet retain all the privileges of the merging and of the surviving company, but
this is so inconceivable a conclusion that the Act can not
be interpreted literally. The meaning,wretchedly expressed,
probably is, that if the merged company had been chartered to build from M to P, fifty miles, it might abandon
its franchise or obligation to build from M to P, and build
only from M to N, twenty five-miles, a right which, except for the Act of 1869, it would not have had.' The
Act of 14 April, 1870, P.L. 7 5 , extended the provisions of
of

UA similar right is given to all railroads, in certain cases, by the Act
i June x883, P.L.57.
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the Acts- providing for the merger and consolidation of
railroad companies, to the merger and consolidation of
a railroad with a canal or navigation company.
The Act of 26 April, 1870, P.L.1274,evidently intended
as a supplement to the Act of 1865, permits the consolidation of companies which have not yet constructed
their roads. The previous acts applied only to completed roads. It also permits the consolidation to be
made under the statutes of other States, not inconsistent
with the legislation of Pennsylvania. The Act of 13 May,
1889, P.L.2o 5 , carefully prescribes the maximum amount
of stock and bonds which may be issued by companies
consolidating or merging. Last to be considered is
the Act of 29 May, 19oi, P.L. 3 49 , which is entitled "An
Act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to provide
for the incorporation and regulation of certain corporations,' approved 29 April, 1874, providing for the merger
and consolidation of certain corporations." Every person familiar with the corporation laws of Pennsylvania
knows that the Act of 1874 has nothing to do with railroads, and it is extremely doubtful whether the'title
of the Act indicates its intention to affect railroads sufficiently to make the Act, as to them, constitutional."'
That the Act was meant to provide a method for the consolidation of railroads as well as of other corporations,
is evident from its proviso, that "nothing in this Act shall
be construed so as to permit railroad, canal or telegraph
companies, which own, operate or in any way control
parallel or competing roads, canals or lines, to merge
or combine." If the implication be that railroad companies can merge as long as they do not control parallel or
competing lines, the Act is a wide departure from the
prior legislation, none of which permitted any but connecting roads to combine. It differs from the former Acts
in two other important respects: in the first place, it
very properly requires for the approval of the consoli" This question is discussed at length, but not decided, by Carson,
Atty. Gen., in re Belevue etc. St. Ry. Co., Ops. Atty. Gen., 1903-4,
P. 42,

1903.
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dation agreement, the consent of "a majority in amount
of the entire capital stock of each of said corporations;"
and in the second place, inasmuch as it contemplates,
like the Act of 1865, the creation of a new corporation'
consistently with the policy adopted in the incorporation
of railroads, it provides (Section 3) that "such merger
or consolidation shall not be complete ...

until it shall

have first obtained from the Governor of the Commonwealth new Letters-Patent." Nothing is said about the
conditions on which the Governor shall grant LettersPatent, and it looks very much as if he is given an incontrollable and unrestricted discretion in the matter,
a situation, to our mind, as bad as when charters could
be granted by special legislation. It has been decided,
although on what ground the writer does not see, that
the Act of i9oi does not repeal the Act of 1865,5 and
the situation accordingly is as follows: One railroad
company can be merged into another with the consent
of the majority of a quorum of the stockholders;' they
may consolidate and form a new corporation either by
the consent of two-thirds of all the stockholders" or of
more than one-half in amount of the stock,' but if they
choose the latter means they must secure the approval of
the Governor. Extra-state roads 9 and roads not constructed70 can consolidate only to form a new corporation,
and for such consolidation they must have the consent
of two-thirds of the stockholders or of more than a majority in value of the stock; while infra-state roads and
roads constructed need only a majority of a quorum."
The condition of the legislation on the subject of merger
and consolidation alone would be a sufficient reason
for a revision of the railroad corporation law.
6SRe Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co., 9 Dauph. Co. R.
" 16 May, i86i, P.L. 702.
6T24 March, 1865, P. L. 49.
68 29 May, 19o,
P.L. 349.
6 24 March, x865, P.L. 49.
70 26 April, 1870, P.L. 1274.
71 16 May, x861, P.L. 702.

21, 19o6.
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What provision is made for dissenting stockholders?
The law on this subject of course is, that when a corporation has been incorporated without the power of
lease, sale or consolidation, such power can be conferred
on it only if it preserves to stockholders opposed to the
exercise of the power, the right to withdraw from the
corporation in cash the value of their interest, the theory
being that an introduction into the contract between the
stockholders of so material an alteration as the privilege
of changing or abandoning the corporate enterprise by
means of a sale, lease or consolidation, is an impairment
of the obligation of that contract as to those not assenting."2 The question has little practical importance now,
however, for the reason that these powers were conferred
long before most of the existing railroads were incorporated, and they therefore formed a part of the original
contract between the corporators. Inasmuch as the
Legislature evidently has intended to give to dissatisfied
stockholders the right to which the Lauman case said
that they were entitled, namely, the right in case of a
fundamental change in the corporate enterprise to withdraw the value of their interest in cash, it is fair to show
how far it has fallen short of an accomplishment of
its intention. The Acts which permit one road to buy
all the stock and bonds of another, or to sell to another
all its stock and bonds,' as well as the Acts enabling
roads to become the lessors of their own, or the lessees
of another company's property and franchises,' make
no provision at all for dissenting stockholders, although
those acts effect just as material a change in the corporate
enterprise as a purchase, sale or consolidation does.
Stranger still, the Act of 22 March, 19oi, P.L. 5 3 , enabling
one road to buy another, considers the transaction such
"Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 1858.
April, z861, P.L. 41o; 31 March, i868, P.L. 50; 17 March, 1869,
P.L. 1i; 15 April, 186 9 , P.L. 3x; 14 April, 1870, P. L. 7 5; 2 July, 1 9o1,
P.L. 603; 4 April, igor, P.L. 62; (amended 23 April, 1903, P.L. 280);
22 April, 19o5, P.L. 264.
74 13 March, 1847, P.L. 337(as explainedby 29 March, x859, P.L. 290),
23 April, i86,P.L. 410; 17 Feb., 1870, P.L. 31; 14 April, 1870, P.L. 75.
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an alteration in the enterprise of the corporation selling,
that its dissenting stockholders are provided for elaborately, but the same transaction isconsidered so unimportant
to the buying corporation that its dissenting stockholders
are not even mentioned. But even where dissenting
stockholders are provided for,75 the corporation is given
the option of paying them what their interest was worth
independently of the act complained of, or else of paying
them the difference between what their interest was worth
independently of the act complained of, and what it was
worth in consequence thereof. In other words, if the
consolidation does not affect the value of the stock of the
constituent companies, a constituent company need pay
a dissenting stockholder nothing, but he must accept
stock in the new company or else be left entirely, a
result certainly not contemplated by the Lauman case.
The question of the constitutionality of the Acts permitting the purchase and guaranty of stock and bonds,
and the lease, purchase and merger and consolidation
of property and franchises, depends upon the following
provisions of the Constitution of 1874: Art, XVII, Sec.
4,"No railroad, canal, or other corporation, or the lessees,
purchasers or managers of any railroad or canal corporation, shall consolidate the stock, property, or franchises
of such corporation with, or lease, or purchase the works
or franchise of, or in any way control any other railroad
or canal corporation owning or having the control of a
parallel or competing line; nor shall any officer of such
railroad or canal corporation act as an officer of any other
railroad or canal corporation owning or having the control
of a parallel or competing line; and the question whether
railroads are parallel or competing lines shall, when
demanded by the party complainant, be decided by a jury,
as in other civil issues." Art. XVII, Sec. 5: "No incorporated company doing the business of a common carrier
shall,.

. .

directly or indirectly, engage in any other bus-

iness than that of common carriers, or hold or acquire
75 x6

May,x86r, P.L. 702;

24

March, x865, P.L. 49; 26 April, 1870,

P.L. 1274; 29 May, x901, P. L. 349.
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lands ... except such as shall be'necessary for carrying
on its business."
The Constitution specifically prescribes as subject to
its provisions that the roads or canals concerned 76 be not
parallel or competing, purchases, leases and consolidations, but it does not speak of the purchase or guaranty
by one railroad of the stock or bonds of another, so an
initial question is, does the purchase by a railroad company of the majority of stock of a parallel or competing
railroad or canal company, if permitted by statute,vfolate
Sec. 4, or the purchase by a railroad company of a majority
of the stock of a mining company, if permitted by statute,
violate Sec. 5? Except for certain decisions hereinafter
referred to, one would be inclined without hesitation to
say that the purchase of a majority of the stock of a parallel or competing company clearly amounts to a "control"
by the one road of a parallel or competing road or canal,
and that the purchase of a majority of the stock of a
mining company was an engagement in a business not
that of a common carrier. A doubt arose as to the first
point, however, from the case of Pullman Car Company
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 1i 5 U.S. 5 9 7 , 1 88 5 ,
where the Court held that the purchase of a majority of
the stock of a railroad company did not amount to the
acquisition of control of the road, on the ground that the
corporalion controls the road, and the stockholders control the corporation, and only through the corporation do
they control the road, a distinction so narrow that one
cannot believe that it will be followed except in cases
like the Pullman Car Company case where it arose only
in the construction of a private contract, and not in cases
where the element of public policy is involved.'
Be16 The encouragement of the competition of a railroad with a canal
was as much in the minds of the framers of the Constitution as that
of a railroad with another railroad. See Act of 24 June, 1895, P. L,
221,

Sec.

22.

71Cf. Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197, 1904 at 328.
Per Harlan, J., "The Circuit Court was undoubtedly right when it
said that the combination referred to 'led inevitably to the following
results: First, it placed the control of the two roads in the hands of a
single person, to wit, the Securities Company, by virtue of its ownership of a large majority of the stock of both corporations.'"
37
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sides which, as pointed out by judge Mc Pherson, in Com.
v. Beech Creek, Clearfield, etc. Railroad Company, i
Pa.C.C.223,J886, that case admits that the purchase
of a majority of the stock gives the control of the corporation, and our Constitutional provision prohibits exactly
that. Accordingly the Qnly Supreme Court case on the
subject in Pennsylvania holds that the purchase by one
railroad of a majority of the stock of a parallel or competing road does constitute the control by the former,
of the latter road.78 On the other hand it was decided
that the ownership by a railroad company of all of the
stock of a mining company which owned mineral land,
did not subject such land to escheat by the Commonwealth," but this decision did not touch the question
whether such ownership violated Section 5 above quoted,
because, as the Court expressly stated, even if it did violate that provision, inasmuch as no legislation had been
adopted for enforcing it, the extraordinary remedy of
escheat could not be given. On the authority of this
case, however, the Secretary of Internal Affairs refused
to certify to the Attorney-General for action, the case of
a railroad company which bought all the stock of a mining
company and for that reason was complained of as indirectly engaging in a business not that of a common carrier,' on the ground that Com. v. N. Y. eic. R. R. Co.,
supra, necessarily led to the conclusion that such a purchase was not an engagement in business. That the case
cited justified the decision we do not believe, nor do we
think that the decision can, or should be, sustained on
any other reasoning. It is true that when a manufacturer
buys a share of the stock of the Federal Mining Company,
he does not become engaged in the business of mining,
but it is equally true that the corporation, the Federal
Mining Company, is engaged in that business, and when
a capitalist buys a majority of its stock, he does become engaged indirectly, to wit through his ownership
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Corn, 7 Atlantic 368, 3 Sadler 83, x886.
t'Com. v.N. Y., Lake Erie & Western R.R. Co., X32 Pa. 591, 189o.
aHarweU v. Buffalo, etc. R. R. Co., 6 Dist. 212, 1897.
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of the body directly engaged in the business of mining.
In cases where a similar question arises, between private
parties, as, for instance, where a man agrees not directly
or indirectly to engage in a certain business during a
given period, his purchase of a majority of the stockof
a corporation engaged in that business would be enjoined."1 Should not the construction of such language be much stricter against a railroad, where the
interests of the public are involved?
With the thought, then, that the purchase by a railroad
of a majority of the capital stock of a parallel or competing railroad or canal, or of a corporation not engaged
in the business of a common carrier, is as much in violation of the Constitution as the purchase or lease of,
or consolidation with, such a railroad or canal or other
corporation, let us see what restrictions are placed by
the enabling statutes as to the corporations a majority
of whose stock may be bought, or whose road or franchises may be sold to, leased by, or consolidated with,
a railroad. Not one of the statutes permitting the
purchase of stock contains any restriction at all either
as to the proportion of stock to be bought or as to the
relation between the roads of the company buying and
the company issuing the stock." The statutes as to
leases provide that the' companies contracting must own
"connecting railroads," or that their roads "shall be
directly or by means of intervening railroads, connected
with each other" ' or that the roads "shall be connected
directly or by means of intervening line ... thus forming
a continuous route for the transportation of persons
and property." ' In the case of sales the railroads
$'Kramerv. Old, x19 N. C. x,%896; Pittsburg Stove, etc. Co. v.
Pa. Stove Co., 2o8 Pa. 37, 1904.
91 23 April, z86z, P.L.410; 31 March, z868, P.L. 50; 17 March, 1869,
P.L. xi, 15 April, x869, P.L. 31; 14 April, 1870, P.L. 75; 2 July, 1901,
P.L. 603; 4 April, 19oi, P. L.62 (amended 23 April, 1903, P.L. 280),
8
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March, i859, P.L. 29o.
April, i86i, P.L. 410.

a 17 February, 187o, P.L., 31.
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must be connecting roads.' Consolidation is permitted
when roads connect' or form "a continuous line of
railroad with each other, or by means of intervening
roads," ' or will form such a continuous line when constructed," or when the roads are not parallel or competing." Except the last-mentioned Act, none of the Acts
cited are in the words of the Constitution. Are they
in synonymous words, or, to put the question more definitely, does permission to connecting roads to enter into
leases, sales or consolidations, forbid parallel or competing
roads to enter into such relations? Giving to the words
underlined their natural meaning, they do not seem to
be antithetical: roads may connect and yet be parallel,
as if the roads were in the shape of an H, that is, parallel
roads connected by means of intervening railroads, and
certainly roads may connect and yet be competing. It
is stated, however, in a standard work, that where statutes
provide for the lease of roads having a connecting, continuous or intersecting line, "this by implication is held
to prohibit a lease to a parallel or competing line." "
The case stated in support of this principle ' does not
justify the statement at all, and the only words which
we have been able to find in any way confirming the declaration were the merest dicta.3 Against this view, on
the other hand, is the very careful definition of "connecting railroads" given by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in construing the Act of 23 April, 186i,P.L. 4 Io, above
referred to, namely, "such a union of tracks as to admit
the passage of cars from one road to the other, or such
intersection of roads as to admit the convenient interS21 June, x865, P.L. 852; 22 March, rgox, P.L. 53.
May, z86i, P.L. 702.

9Tx6

8 24 March, 1865, P.L. 498 26 April, 1870, P.L. 1274.90 29 May, I9Oi, P.L. 3499123
A. and E. Ency. Law (2nd Ed.) 779.
92 Eel River R. R. Co. v. State, 155 Ind. 433, 190093Per Mr. J. Brown, in Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Ky., 16x U. S.
637, x896, at 687.
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change of freight and passengers at the point of intersection." 9 No suggestion that connecting roads could
not be competing; indeed in the very case in which this
definition was given, the roads said to connect, three
times were spoken of as "rival corporations." If further
evidence be needed in support of the contention that
roads may connect and yet compete, it is found in the
Constitution of 1874, Art. XVII, Section i, which gives
every railroad "the 'right with its road to ... connect
with ... any other railroad," a provision whose purpose

is "obviously to compel roads, coming together at any
point, to allow a connection, if desired by either." '
This would not be necessary had it not been in the mind of
the framers of the Constitution that roads might come together, and yet be so far hostile, because of competition,
that the right of connection must be granted expressly.
Or, to reason in another way, can we say that connecting
roads can not be parallel or competing, when the Constitution provides that any roads may connect?
Even admitting that we are correct in regarding the
statutes just considered, as not sufficiently restrictive to
meet the Constitutional requirement, it, of course, does
not follow that they are entirely unconstitutional. In
so far as they apply to connecting roads which are not
parallel or competing they are valid, and it is only as to
connecting roads which are parallel or competing, that
they are illegal. It needs no argument, however, to show
that the amendments necessary to render these acts
entirely constitutional should be made.
So much for the statutes concerning the relations between railroads. Let us consider now those treating of
the relation between a railroad and other corporations.
These are four in number, and authorize the purchase and
guaranty by a railroad company of the stock and bonds
of "corporations authorized by law to develop the coal,
iron, lumber and other material interests of -this Coin9

Per Woodward, C. J., in P. & E. R. R. Co., 53 Pa. 20, x866, at 61.
95 Per Stowe, P. J., in Graff v. Evergreen, R. R. Co., 2 Pa. C. C. 502,
x886.
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monwealth,"' 6 of corporations "engaged in the business
of transportation, either on land or water, or owning an
actual majority of the stock entitled to vote of any corporation so engaged, and also of any warehouse, storage,
elevator or terminal company, whose business is incidental to the business of transportation in which the purchasing or guarantying corporation shall be authorized to
engage, 9 of "any other corporations,""3 and of water
companies." None of these statutes limits the proportion of the stock of the companies indicated which a
railroad company can buy, and if we are correct in our
view that the purchase of the majority of the stock of
a corporation is an indirect engagement in the business
in which the c6rporation is engaged, it is submitted that
all of these Acts are unconstitutional, with the possible
exception of the Act of 4 April, i9oi. The reason why
that Act may be valid, although the Actof

22

April, r905,

is not, is, that the former Act permits the indirect engagement in the business only when incidental to the business
of the railroad, while the latter Act would allow a railroad
company whose road was not within 5oo miles of a certain
district to be engaged indirectly in the business of a water
company incorporated with the privilege of operating
in that district and therein only.
This brings us to the last phase of our discussion: What
is the penalty for a violation of the constitutional provisions? As to the prohibition against engaging in any
business other than that of common carriers, there has not
been the slightest attempt to provide for its enforcement,
although the Court has called attention directly to the
necessity of lgislation. 1' As to the prohibition against
buying, leasing, merging with or controlling parallel
or competing railroads, an Act was passed in x9o1

96 xS

April, 1869, P. L. 31.
4 April, x9oz, P.L. 6a (as amended 23 April, 1903, P.L. 280).
n2 July, i9o, P.L. 603.
22 April, x9o5, P. L. 264.
110Commonwealth v. N. Y. etc. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. S9I, x8go, at 596.
'a 4 April, 19o0, P.L. 6i.
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which purported to enforce Art. XVII. Sec. 4, but which
is so defective that only the presumption of sincerity
brings one to admit that it really may have been intended
to effect its expressed purpose. The prohibition of the
Constitution was against the combination of a railroad
with any parallel or competing roads, but the Act gratuitously qualified the prohibition by limiting it to the combination of a railroad with "any other railroad or canal
corporation, organized under the laws of this State,
owning or having under its control within this State a
parallel or competing line." In other words, parallel
and competing roads may combine, as far as the Act of
i9o goes, if one of them happens to be organized under
the laws of any other State than Pennsylvania-a condition.not at all unlikely to exist in view of the statutes permitting Pennsylvania railroad corporations to consolidate with corporations of other states, owning or operating
connecting roads--or if one of them owns or has under
its control a line parallel or competing, but not in this
State. For instance roads paralleling each other at a
distance of five miles may combine if one road is just
south of the boundary line between Pennsylvania and
New York, and one just north of that line, although
they may not if one road is just south of the Pennsylvania-New York line and the other just north of the
Pennsylvania-Maryland line. The Act of 19oi contains,
too, a remarkable proviso, excepting from its rigors
cases where "a railroad corporation has furthered or
shall further the construction of a line parallel and competing with its own, by subscribing to a majority of the
stock of a corporation organized for that purpose." Here
is a paradox: a company itself to build and operate a
competing road! If competition implies anything, it
implies a negation of common ownership. Was there
ever a corporation which would finance its rival? Or
can a railroad compete with itself? Unless these questions be answered in the affirmative, it is submitted that
the proviso of the Act of 19o has no meaning. And now
let us consider the penalty provided for a violation of
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the Act. It "may be -attackedor restrained by appropriate
proceedings at law or in equity, at the instance of the
Commonwealth, acting through the Attorney-General,
and any such violation shall also constitute a misdemeanor, for which the offending corporation, as well as
the president and members of the Board of Directors
participating therein, may. be indicted and punished,
separately or collectively." A completed violation of
the Act may be attacked, but with what result? The corporation may be indicted, and punished, but with what
punishment? And the officers-shall they be fined or
imprisoned? Compare this emasculated legislation with
the Act of 24 June, I8 9 5,P.L.22I, sec. 22, designed to prevent the combination of canals and parallel or competing
railroads or canals. That act gives the complainant a
right to a jury trial on the question whether "any such
control as is hereby prohibited has been established,
directly or indirectly"-an inestimably valuable privilege. If the Act has been violated the officers participant are fined $ioo.oo "for each day that such prohibited

consolidation, lease, purchase .or control, is in force or
effect," and if the offence be repeated "all shares of
such corporation by the ownership of which such prohibited consolidation, lease, purchase or control, is effected
or maintained shall be forfeited to the State," and the
control of the corporate property entrusted to those,
if any, who protested against the unlawful act. With the
Act of 1895 available, the framers of the Act of igoi ought
not to have gone astray so deplorably, had they -desired
to imitate that excellent model.
So much for the so-to-speak external development of
our road. What of its internal development? Suppose
that at first, uncertain of success, we had deemed it unwise to condemn and thereby become liable to pay for the
sixty feet which the Act of 1 868 would have permitted
us to take for our right of way, and had taken only forty
feet. Our venture has prospered and we must lay additional tracks, for which our forty feet right of way is too
narrow. We can not condemn twenty feet more under
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the Act of 1868, for the first taking exhausted the right
given by the Act of 1868."2 To remedy such a predicament, the Act of 17 March, i86 9 ,P.LI2, was passed, con-

ferring on railroad companies the right to straighten,
widen and otherwise improve their lines, and for that
purpose to purchase or appropriate land or materials,
making compensation therefor in the manner provided
by the Act of 1849. The Act does not expressly except
any class of property from liability to condemnation,
and the Supreme Court has decided that a railroad could
condemn, for the purpose of widening its road, even a
dwelling-house occupied by its owner, although such a
house could not be taken, under the Act of 1849, for the
purpose of constructing the road.1" In favor of this
decision one can say almost anything except that it carried out the probable intention of the Legislature.'"
Certainly there is at least as much reason why an inconveniently-located house should not be permitted to
obstruct the construction of a road as its widening, and
it seems scarcely conceivable that after passing-the Railroad Act of i868 which embodies the exemption of dwelling-houses from liability to condemnation for the purpose
of building the road, the Legislature the next year should
pass an Act intended to repeal the exemption in the case
of proceedings to widen. The truth of the matter is, that
the Court disapproved of the exemption in both cases,
and took advantage of the careless wording of the
Act of 1869 to correct in part the unwisdom of the Act
of i868.
The Act of x869 does not confer the right to build
branches or extensions."
An examination of the entire
body of our railroad legislation shows that this important
102 Tissue
0

1

v. Pittsburgetc. R. R. Co., 12 Dist. 178, 1902.
3 Dryden v. Pittsburg, Virginia & Charleston R. R. Co., 208 Pa.

316, 1904.
104

sCf. Bubenezer v. P., B. & W. R. R. Co., 61 Atlantic, 270 (Del.
igoS); where practically the same question arose, and was decided in
favor of the owner of the house. The Dryden case is discussed and
disapproved.
105P. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. P. &"R. R. R. Co., x Dist. 73 (1892).
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right derives a tenuous existence solely from Section 9 of
the Act of i868, P.L.62, which authorizes any company
incorporated under it "to construct such branches from
its main line as it may deem necessary to increase its
business and accommodate the trade and travel of the
public."1 ° Next to the provisions concerning location,
there is no part of our railroad legislation so defective
as that concerning branches and extensions. The only
legislation on the subject except Section 9 before quoted,
is the Act of 22 April, 1863, P. L. 532, enabling railroads
authorized to build branches, specially to mortgage the
same, and to issue bonds up to $15,000 per mile.

With

this scant assistance from the statutes, we must determine the rights and liabilities of railroad companies
as to branching. The decisions show that the provisions
of other sections of the Act of i868 imposing on the
company restrictions as to its road, are not applicable
to its branches. For instance there must be at least
$io,ooo of capital per mile of road but not a cent per
mile of branch, so that a five-mile road may have two
branches each ten miles long-for a branch may be longer
than the main line 1 -and still require a capital of only
$5o,ooo, being $io,ooo for each mile of main line, but
only $2,000 for each mile of main line and branches.
Again, the main line of a road must be built within five
years after the company is incorporated, but there is no
time within which a branch must be constructed even
after its location by the company.1" One is thus brought
to the conclusion that because Section 9 of the Act of
i868 does not state that the provisions restricting a company as to its main line shall apply also to its branches,
the company is not so restricted. But it is to be observed
'0 Companies organized to build roads less than 15 miles long, are
given the right to build extensions by the Act of 21 May, i88i, P.L. 27.
The Act places no restriction on the length or direction of the extension,
and under its benignant terms a I s-mile road may become a great
trunk line.
107Volmer's App., xis Pa. x66, 1886.
10
8Pittsburg, Va. etc. R. R. Co. v. Pittsburg, Catnonsburg,etc. R. R.
CO., I9 Pa. 331, 1893.

CORPORATION

LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA.

that if Section 9 does not expressly extend to branches
the restrictions of the Act, neither does it extend to
them its benefits. The same section of the Act of 1868
which requires companies to build their roads within
five years from their organization, gives them the right
of eminent domain, and if the former part of the section
does not apply to branches, why should the latter part?
Whence, it is seriously asked, do railroads derive the power
to condemn land for the purpose of building branches?
It is not given in terms, and it scarcely will be claimed that
the authority to build branches by necessary implication
includes the power to condemn land for that purpose, in
view of the fact that the framers of the Act of 1849 evidently thought it necessary expressly to grant that power
even for the purpose of the building of the main line,
and that the framers of the Act of 1869 after authorizing
railroads to straighten, widen or otherwise improve their
lines, deemed it necessary expressly to empower them
"for such purposes to purchase, hold and use, or enter
upon, take and appropriate, land and material." If,
however, it be held that the right of eminent domain as
given by the Act of 1849 does extend to the taking of
land for branches, the condition still is very bad. We
have attempted before to show the extreme impropriety
of permitting a railroad company to condemn private
property by the mere secret location of a route. But
there are at least two safeguards in the case of the main
line-its construction must be begun within two years,
and, its termini and length being known, its general direction can be approximated. Even these safeguards
do not exist in the case of branches-no time is limited for
the beginning of their construction, and they may be of
any desired length and go from any desired point of the
main line, in any desired direction."
A radical change
is needed iiithis part of our railroad law, in line with the
improvement made on the same subject in the Street Railway Act, 3 May, 1905, P.L. 3 68, Sec. 4, which requires the
'0

Western Pa. R. R. Co.'s Appeal, 99 Pa. x55, 1881.
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filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth of a copy
of the resolution providing for the branch or extension,
containing a detailed description of its route, the approval
thereof by the Governor if he thinks. it within the general
scope of the original charter and not violative of any existing rights, and the recording of a certificate of authority
to build the branch or extension, in the county or counties where the branch or extension lies.
The last subject upon which we desire to touch is the
question of the right of railroads to connect with each other.
So advantageous to the Commonwealth was it considered
that there should be continuous passage of cars and engines over long lines of road, thus avoiding the delay
and inconvenience of changing cars, that such early
legislation as the Act of 13 March, i8 4 7 ,P.L. 3 3 7 , authorized connecting railroads to run their cars and engines
over each other's tracks by mutual agreement. The Act
of 4 April, i868, P.L.62, went still further, and provided
(Sec. ii) that a railroad company should have the right
to connect its road with the road of any other railroad
company in the Commonwealth, and if the latter company
would not agree to conditions of connection, the same
should be determined by a jury appointed by the Court.
The first section of Art. XVII of the Constitution of 1874
emphatically declared "every railroad company shall
have the right, with its road, to intersect, connect with,
or cross any other railroad; and shall receive and transport each the other's passengers, tonnage and cars, loaded
or empty, without delay or discrimination." Further
"to facilitate the movement of traffic and the interchange
of cars," the Act of 23 April, 1903, P.L.28o, establishes
a standard gauge, and requires that all tracks shall be
laid of that gauge. In the face of these clear expressions
in favor of a policy of through traffic, come the Acts of
7 June, I9o, P.L.514 and 7 June, 19 oI,P.L. 5 23 , the former

forbidding (Sec. 8) street railways to connect their tracks
with railroad companies allowed to carry both passengers
and freight, and declaring unlawful "the interchange of
cars and continuous movement thereof between and over
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the tracks of such street passenger railway company and
such railroad company," and the latter containing similar
prohibitions (Sec. 2) in the case of elevated and underground passenger railways. The constitutionality of
Section 8 of the Act of 7 June, i9oi, P.L. 5 14 , perhaps

is open to question because the title of the Act, while
specifically mentioning the subject-matter of every other
section of the Act, contains no reference at all to the contents of Section 8. Aside from this, however, the effect of
the Acts is this:
An underground and elevated passenger railway company builds its road from the heart to the edge of a great
city. A railroad company builds its road, of the same
gauge, operated by the same motive power, employing
the same kind of cars, from without the city to its border.
Thanks to the Acts of 19ox, it may bring its tracks to

within a few inches of, but may not connect with, the
tracks of the passenger railway, and passengers must get
off the railroad cars and be loaded into the railway cars,
although both railroad and railway company may desire
the connection of tracks and continuous movement of cars,
and although such connection and movement may be
entirely feasible. The legislation is anomalous and its
enactment undoubtedly was due to the fear that without it railway companies might become, contrary to their
charters, carriers of freight. That such legislation was
apparently not required until I9o is strong evidence that
this fear was not well grounded, but admitting its reasonableness, it did not justify a prohibition which prevents
the continuous movement of passenger trains, which most
of the suburban trains are. Under no view of the subject
should anything but the running of the railroad's freight
cars over the railway company's tracks be forbidden.
But, finis sit of criticism, even with such tempting
morsels as the Act forbidding the giving of passes,'
adopted, as Buckalew says, in contempt of the Consti11015 June, x874, P. L. 289.
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tution,"' as the Act to prevent discrimination " and
the Act to prohibit officers of railroads from being interested in contracts made by their railroads," because
the writer feels that if even a small part of the criticism
which he has directed at our railroad law, be warranted,
the whole code surely will be examined and corrected.
Morris Wolf.
"' Cons. of Pa., p.

27!.

11 4 June, x883, P.L. 72, Sec. x and 2.
1134 June, z883, P.L. 72, Sec. 3-

